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Japan's Communications Interception
Act: Unconstitutional Invasion of
Privacy or Necessary Tool?
ABSTRACT

In August 1999, Japan became the last of the G8 nations to pass
legislation to allow law enforcement to wiretap communications. For
some, passage of the law was long overdue; for others, its passage
marked the beginning of an impermissible government encroachment
This Note examines Japan's Communications
on civil rights.
Interception Act, the forces in Japanese society creating the need for
the law, and the reasons why the law is being challenged. Part II
examines the policy behind the law, its history, and public reaction to
the law. Part III presents the history of organized crime in Japan,
and a commentary on its impact in Japan and on the international
community. PartIV analyzes the legal challenges to the law. Part V
discusses the potential efficacy of the wiretap law in combating
Japanese organized crime and the likelihood of abuse in the
implementation of the law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................
THE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION ACT ...................

A.
B.
C.
III.

The Communications InterceptionAct
and OtherAnti-Organized Crime Laws .............
ContrastingJapan's WiretappingLaw
with that of Other G8 Countries.........................
PublicReaction to the Communications
Interception A ct ...................................................

896
899
900

THE NECESSITY OF THE WIRETAP: GROWTH

OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAPAN .....................................

A.
B.
C.
IV.

894
896

The Yakuza and Other Organized
Crim inal Groups .................................................
Dangers of Organized Crime to Japanese
Society ..................................................................
Global Threats of Organized Crime ...................

902

902
905
909

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE COMMUNICATIONS

INTERCEPTION ACT .........................................................

910

ConstitutionalIssues...........................................
Objections Based on Criminal Procedure..........
Public Distrust of Police......................................

910
915
919

A.
B.
C.

894
V.
VI.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:893

WILL THE WIRETAP LAW BE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL
IN FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME? ............ . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ..
C ONCLUSION ...................................................................

920
923

I. INTRODUCTION

Organized crime poses problems not only for the individual
countries in which criminal groups reside and operate, but also
creates significant risks for the international community.
As
international borders become more porous, the world is becoming a
global community where events in one country no longer have only
domestic consequences. As international exchange continues at a
rapidly expanding pace, cooperation among foreign governments
becomes increasingly important to ensure that domestic problems do
not penetrate into the international community. Implicit in this
phenomenon is the reality that individual countries must pass
legislation, even make significant changes to existing domestic laws,
to protect the global community from organized crime.
To better cooperate with the international community in
combating organized crime, many facets of the Japanese criminal
procedure law are in need of revision. Criminal procedure laws in
Japan are ill equipped to deal with the requirements of modern
investigations and trials.1 Outdated provisions that hinder Japanese
authorities' ability to adequately fight organized crime in Japan make
it difficult for Japan to play an effective role in the global fight
against organized crime across borders. 2 However, increasing
pressure from the international community on Japan to strengthen
its laws to fight organized crime, 3 as well as concern among Japanese
citizens, has caused Japan to begin debating the passage of new,
more assertive criminal laws. One such step in that direction came in
August 1999, when the Japanese Diet passed the Communications

1.
Combating Cross-Border Crime, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, May 1, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 10658165.
2.
Id. Examples of outdated provisions that inhibit Japanese investigations
into organized criminal activities include an absence of legislation that allows
prisoners in Japan to be transported abroad for testimony, and an absence of
legislation giving witnesses immunity from criminal prosecution, or freedom to travel
safely without fear of arrest or harm. Id. In addition, a 1998 U.N. General Assembly
draft protocol to combat organized crime called for international cooperation in
criminal investigations and trials, a plan under which Japan cannot cooperate due to
the fact that under existing Japanese law, an act in question must be recognized as a
crime both in Japan and in the country requesting cooperation before Japan can
cooperate. Id.
3.
Tatsuya Fukumoto, Government looks at bills to fight organized crime,
DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 11, 1999, at 3, availableat 1999 WL 5466664.
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Interception Act, 4 a law that allows investigators to wiretap
telephone conversations and other communications of suspected
criminals for the first time in Japan's history.
Wiretapping is an effective measure for combating organized
crime because it enables investigators to target the pivotal figures
controlling criminal organizations that have consistently remained
beyond the reach of the law in Japan. 5 Investigators in most other
industrialized nations have the authority to tap communications for
criminal investigations. 6 Japan is the last of the G8 nations to pass
such a law. 7 Even though the new wiretap law may benefit Japan's
citizens by combating organized crime, it is one of the most
controversial laws passed by the Japanese Diet in recent history.8 In
an attempt to delay the final vote, opposition Diet Members dragged
out voting on the bill and turned the vote into a twenty-eight hour
session. 9 Reaction to the Communications Interception Act has been
divided, with some sectors of society claiming that the law is
necessary to prevent Japan from becoming a hotbed for international
crime, 10 and other groups claiming that the law is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy subject to abuse due to the
nature of Japanese criminal investigations and police powers.
August 18, 1999, the date of the bill's passage, has even been called
"Japan's Day of Shame."'1 The law went into effect in August 2000,
but there is substantial support in Japan for its repeal.
This Note examines the Communications Interception Act, the
forces in Japanese society creating the necessity for the law, and the
reasons why the law is being challenged. Part II analyzes the law
itself, including the history and policy behind the passage of the law,
as well as public reaction to it. Part III explores the history and

4.
Hanzai sosa no tame no tsushin boju ni kansuru horitsu [Communications
Interception Act], Law No. 137 of Aug. 18, 1999. This law has not yet been translated
into English; the Japanese text is available at http://www.ron.gr.jp/law/
law/touchou.htm.
5.
Editorial, Care needed in application of wiretap law, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug.
16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25270801.

6.
Editorial, Listening in on organized crime, DAILY YOMIURI, May 26, 1999,
availableat 1999 WL 177754312 [hereinafter Listening in].
7.

Fukumoto, supra note 3.

8.
Martyn Williams, Japan Wiretap Bill Debate Goes Through the Night,
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 20018684 (stating that opposition
parties in the Diet forced the government into an all-night debate, an event that had
not occurred since 1992).
9.
Jon Choy, New Laws Boost Tokyo's Anticrime Powers and Public's Privacy
Concerns, JAPAN ECON. INST. REP., Aug. 20, 1999, available at http://www.jei.org/
Archive/JEIR99/9932w2.html.
10.
Fukumoto, supra note 3 (quoting Kazuhiro Watanabe, counselor with the
Secretariat of the Justice Minister).
11.
Michael Hoffman, Bugged by Big Brother, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3,
2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL 6948388 (quoting Shukan Hoseki, a Japanese
magazine, referring to the passage of the Communications Interception Act).
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growth of organized crime in Japan, and its impact upon both the
Japanese and international communities. Part IV analyzes the legal
challenges to the law, including constitutional issues, and
characteristics of the Japanese law enforcement system that create
the potential for abuse in the law's application. Finally, Part V
discusses the potential efficacy of the wiretap law in combating
Japanese organized crime, and the likelihood of abuse in the
implementation of the law.

II. THE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION ACT
This section addresses the Communications Interception Act
itself. Reasons for the passage of the law are discussed, and the law
itself is compared with that of other G8 countries. This section
concludes with an examination of public reaction to the law.
A. The Communications Interception Act and Other Anti-Organized
Crime Laws
During the last decade, the United Nations has devoted
12
significant attention to the growth of transnational organized crime;
such crime has increased due to factors such as the end of the Cold
War and the process of globalization of trade and information. 13 In
1999, the United Nations set up a special panel to work out a global
14
anti-crime treaty, in an effort to combat the globalization of crime.
By taking part in the treaty, signatories agree to take legislative
measures designed to strengthen government power to fight
organized crime to ensure compliance with the treaty. 15 The treaty
calls for international cooperation in criminal investigations and
trials, but Japan's criminal procedure laws contain provisions that
make it difficult to meet the requirements of modern investigations
and trials.' 6
The treaty's proposal encouraged the Japanese
legislature to begin thinking about updating some of its own criminal

12.
UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 221 (Graeme
Newman ed., 1999).

13.
14.
15.

Id.
CombatingCross-Border Crime, supra note 1.
Id.

16.
Id.
Signatories to the treaty, which was signed in Palermo, Italy in
December 2000, are legally required to harmonize laws against organized criminal
groups and corruption. See Gu Zhenqiu, New U.N. Treaty Marks Major Advance in

World Cooperation to Clamp Down on Global Crime, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 17,
2000, available at 2000 WL 29162783. Countries must harmonize laws on money
laundering, extradition, the protection of witnesses testifying against criminal groups,
and provide resources to countries that need help. Id.
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laws. 17 In a step toward enacting effective laws to fight organized
crime, the Japanese legislature passed a series of laws against
organized crime in 1999, the most notable of which was the
Communications Interception Act.'
Until the passage of the Communications Interception Act in
1999, Japan remained the only Member Country of the G8 without a
law permitting law enforcement authorities to monitor telephone and
computer communications. 19 Government wiretapping of suspicious
communications is not only an effective way to stop criminal acts
before they occur, but it is also an effective tool to fight organized
crime, because it enables the authorities to obtain valuable evidence
against leaders of organized 20criminal groups who are typically
insulated and difficult to catch.
In addition to the pressure on Japan from the United Nations,
Japan's government faced increasing pressure from foreign
21
governments to strengthen laws designed to fight organized crime.
In recent years, the incidence of drug and arms smuggling involving
Japanese crime syndicates has been on the rise, which has led to
increased pressure on the Japanese government both internally and
externally to strengthen investigative powers. 22 Members of the
Japanese government, as well as foreign governments, have become
concerned that Japan lacks effective laws to deal with organized
23
crime.
The Communications Interception Act was one of three bills
passed by the Japanese Diet in 1999 designed to tighten measures
against organized crime. 24 The bill's passage, however, was not easy;

17.
See Combating Cross Border Crime, supra note 1.
Id. Japan still lacks laws necessary for complete compliance with the U.N.
18.
Treaty, such as laws that would allow Japanese prisoners to be transported abroad for
testimony, and laws protecting foreign witnesses in Japan, giving them freedom to
travel safely without fear of arrest or harm. Id. Japan also lacks laws permitting the
Japanese government to cooperate with a country requesting cooperation unless the
crime in question is recognized as a crime both at home and in the county requesting
assistance. Id.
Fukumoto, supra note 3. In fact, investigators in most major industrialized
19.
countries have the ability to tap communications. Listening in, supra note 6.
20.
Listening in, supra note 6.
21.
Fukumoto, supranote 3.
22.
Id. In December 1998, a G8 teleconference concerning the transfer of
illegally obtained funds by crime syndicates was held and attended by the justice and
home affairs ministers of Member Governments of the G8. Id. In the conference, U.K.
representatives who chaired the meeting asked Japanese participants to explain the
current situation of Japanese laws designed to tackle organized crime, including its
lack of a statute allowing law enforcement authorities to monitor telephone and
computer communications. Id.
Fukumoto, supra note 3 (quoting Kazuhiro Watanabe, a counselor with the
23.
Secretariat of Justice).
Mina Hasegawa, WiretappingLaw has Cities Cringing, NIKKEi WKLY., Aug.
24.
21, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei Weekly File. Other bills included
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opposition parties used every possible tactic to block or delay passage
of the bill. 25 Concerned that authorities could easily abuse their
expanded powers, opposition parties boycotted meetings of the
Judicial Affairs subcommittees of both houses, threatened to walk out
of the general assembly, and submitted a series of no confidence
motions against Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and cabinet ministers
involved in drafting the bill. 26 When it became apparent that they
could not stop the wiretap bill's passage, opposition parties attempted
to delay the vote as long as possible and turned the final vote into a
twenty-eight hour session. 27 The bill passed in August 1999, but its
enactment was delayed until August 2000 due to the need to develop
necessary systems and equipment, and to finalize specific procedures
28
and rules.
The final version of the Communications Interception Act is a
Japanese police, feeling
compromise from its original form.
constrained in their ability to assist in global crime-fighting efforts
and investigations while organized crime has grown in sophistication
and widened in scope in recent years, 29 believed that wiretapping
communications would be the only effective way to identify the chains
of command in criminal syndicates. 30 Accordingly, the initial wiretap
bill would have given authorities the power to tap communications in
more than one hundred types of crimes generally committed by
organized criminal groups. 3 1 The strong opposition to the bill
combined with a feeling of an urgent need to address organized crime
issues caused the drafters to revise the bill so that only four specific
crimes could provide the basis for legitimate wiretapping. 32 The final
version of the bill also restricts the ability of investigators to use the
law by placing strict conditions on its usage.

a bill to impose heavier penalties for organized crimes such as money laundering and a
bill to amend the Criminal Procedure Code to protect witnesses in cases involving
organized crime. Id.
Choy, supra note 9. Four political groups, the Liberal Democratic Party,
25.
the Liberal Party, the Kaikaku Club, and the New Komeito formed a majority alliance
to pass the bill. Id.
26.
Id. Political parties opposed to the bill included the Democratic Party of
Japan, the Japanese Communist Party, and the Social Democratic Party. Wiretap bills
rammed through upper house panel, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Aug. 16, 1999, available at
1999 WL 22841133 [hereinafter Wiretap bills].
Wiretap bills, supra note 26. Opponents engaged in the "ox-walk," creeping
27.
up to the podium at a snail's pace to cast their ballots, thus turning a five-minute
procedure into an almost two-hour procedure. Williams, supra note 8. The bill passed
by a vote of 142 to 99. See Choy, supra note 9.
Hasegawa, supra note 24.
28.
Choy, supra note 9.
29.
30.
Hasegawa, supra note 24.
Listening in, supra note 6.
31.
32.
Id.
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The four types of crime in which wiretapping is allowed under
the Communications Interception Act are drug trafficking, illicit
firearms trade, organized murder, and the smuggling of illegal
immigrants into Japan. 33
Media that can be tapped include
communications.3 4
e-mail
and
facsimiles,
calls,
telephone
Communications can only be wiretapped for a period of ten days, and
can be extended to no more than thirty days. 35 Authorities can only
resort to wiretapping if a warrant is obtained and there is no other
way to obtain evidence, 36 and only public prosecutors and police
37
officers of the rank of superintendent and above can seek warrants.
38
District court judges must issue warrants.
If telephone lines are
tapped, a third-party non-police witness, such as a staff member of
the telephone company or an employee from regional governments,
must be present. 39 Furthermore, investigators must use a technique
called spot monitoring, in which only portions of conversations may
be listened to and wiretapping must terminate when a conversation is
understood to be innocent. 40 Individuals must be notified that they
have been the subjects of wiretapping within thirty days and all
records of innocent conversation must be destroyed 4' after notifying
42
individuals that their communications have been monitored.
B. ContrastingJapan's Wiretapping Law with that of Other G8
Countries
Proponents of the Communications Interception Act have called
attention to its strict procedures in contrast to similar laws already
introduced in the United States and other major industrialized
countries. Arguably, strict procedures guard against abuse of the
wiretapping law. For example, Japan's law allows wiretapping of
communications in only four specific types of crimes. 43 In contrast,
wiretapping laws in the United States, Germany, France, and Italy
permit the interception of communications in a broader variety of

33.
Id. These four types of crimes represent activities in which organized
criminal groups are heavily involved. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
34.
Choy, supra note 9.
35.
Id.
36.
Hoffman, supra note 11.
37.
Choy, supra note 9.
38.
Id.
39.
Hasegawa, supra note 24.
40.
Hoffman, supra note 11. Spot tapping involves using equipment that
automatically cuts the connection when a certain length of time has passed. Wiretaps
Vital in War on High-Tech Crime, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 21, 2000, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Nikkei Weekly File.
41.
Hoffman, supra note 11.
42.
Choy, supra note 9.
43.
Listening in, supra note 6.
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crimes. 44 The ten day limit on duration in Japan is far more strict
than in other countries. 45 In the United States, a suspect can be
wiretapped for thirty days with an unlimited number of extensions, in
Germany, monitoring can be conducted for up to three months with
the limit is four months with
no limit on extensions, and in France,
46
extensions.
of
number
the
no limit on
Critics of the law have not been comforted by these contrasts,
however. As one critic pointed out, "L]ust a simple comparison of
institutional differences is nonsense. '47 Japanese procedures for
criminal investigation are different from procedures in other
countries, so drawing simple contrasts between the Japanese wiretap
law and the laws in other countries cannot adequately quell fears
48
that the law will not lead to unconstitutional invasions of privacy.
and
In particular, differences in the treatment of criminal suspects
49
evidence laws may make the restrictions less meaningful.
C. PublicReaction to the CommunicationsInterception Act
The newly-enacted wiretap law has met strong opposition from
political parties, citizens groups, and the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations.5" The main concerns stem from a fear that authorities
will abuse the powers granted to them by the new law. In recent
years, the Japanese public has grown increasingly distrustful of the
police. 5 1 Critics of the law claim that the restrictions placed on its
use, such as limiting wiretapping to only certain types of crime, will
be impossible to enforce. 52 There are also claims that police might
use information obtained through the course of wiretapping that is
not directly related to a crime. 53 The wiretapping law allows a
to
reporter's conversations and messages to be tapped, leading some
54
press.
the
of
freedom
with
interfere
will
fear that investigations
Some lawmakers claim that by allowing wiretapping, the
Japanese public will be exposed to the danger of arbitrary police

Japan's Wiretap Law in Comparison with Major Countries' Systems (Aug.
44.
http://www.usc.edu/isd/archives/dsjp/summaries/1999/
available at
1999),
13,
August/Sm990816.htm [hereinafter Wiretap Law].
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
45.
Wiretap Law, supranote 44.
46.
Id. (quoting Hiroaki Kami, deputy chief of the secretariat to the anti47.
wiretapping law headquarters set up by the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations).
See id.
48.
Id.
49.
Fukumoto, supra note 3.
50.
See Williams, supra note 8.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Wiretap, but Carefully, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, available in LEXIS,
54.
News Library, Japan Times File.
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surveillance of their day-to-day communications. 55 Studies that
report rights violations in the United States from excesses in
wiretapping by U.S. authorities have further fueled the fear that
Japanese authorities will abuse the new law. 56 Some critics have
pointed to legal culture, such as the broad authority granted to police
in criminal procedural laws, as a reason why the general public
should be concerned about the implementation of the law. 57 These
claims have caused fears that the checks and safeguards placed on
the law's use are not sufficient to constrain the powers conferred upon
the authorities. 58
There has been considerable support in Japan to repeal the
The most vocal opponents,
Communications Interception Act.
however, are not members of the general public, but specific interest
Telecommunications industry workers, who will be
groups.
59
responsible for acting as third party witnesses to wiretapping,
Internet service providers, 60 and opposition politicians have been
61
vocal in opposing the law.
Japanese attorneys are also vocal opponents of the law.
According to Kazuo Miyazaka, a Japanese attorney, attorneys fear
that some of the advice that an attorney gives to a client, if overheard
62
by police, could raise legal issues, or possibly even criminal charges.
For example, Miyazaka asserts that it is common practice for
attorneys in Japan to advise clients on the brink of bankruptcy to
make some transfers of assets to protect the client's estate. 63 In
Japan, it is not only illegal for bankrupt individuals to transfer assets
in this situation, but it is also illegal for attorneys to advise their
64
clients to do so.
Some Japanese citizens have suggested that opposition to the
Communications Interception Act is exaggerated because members of
the media are among those most opposed to the Act. Hajime Nakata,
a Japanese attorney with the law firm of Miyake and Yamazaki,
believes that the media has drummed up a considerable amount of

55.
Listening in, supra note 6.
56.
Wiretap, but Carefully, supra note 54 (reporting on a U.S. human rights
group report that wiretaps were used twelve million times in a fourteen-year period,
but most cases had nothing to do with the crime).
57.
Choy, supra note 9.
58.
See id.
59.
Hasegawa, supranote 24.
Internet service providers fear the costs involved in establishing a system
60.
that would enable police to catch all e-mail sent to a single account. Williams, supra
note 8.
61.
Martyn Williams, Japan's Police Gain Right to Tap Phones and E-Mail, at
http://europe.cnn.com.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/16/japan.police.idg.
62.
Interview with Kazuo Miyazaka, attorney in Nashville, TN (Dec. 4, 2001).
Kazuo Miyazaka is an alias used to protect the identity of the source.
Id.
63.
64.
Id.

902

VANDERBILT ]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:893

opposition to the Act because the media fears that the police will use
the law to monitor communications between the media and its
sources. 65 Nakata suggests that this fear stems from the broad
powers granted to police after World War II, which police used to
keep a close watch over the media. 66 Fearful of the past, the media
generates much of the negative publicity of the law in an attempt to
create more opposition. Despite opinion polls showing that most of
the general public did not support the law and felt that clauses to
prevent abuses would be ineffective, much of the Japanese public
seems unconcerned by the wiretapping law, and many people even
67
view the law as a necessity.

III. THE

NECESSITY OF THE WIRETAP: GROWTH OF ORGANIZED CRIME

IN JAPAN

To understand why Japan decided to pass the Communications
Interception Act, it is important to understand the nature and
activities of Japanese organized criminal syndicates, and the extent
to which organized crime affects Japan and the global community.
The dangers that organized crime poses to Japanese society and the
Japanese economy threatens to create more problems for the
international community and Japan if criminal syndicates continue to
remain beyond the reach of law enforcement.
A. The Yakuza and Other Organized Criminal Groups
Organized crime is as problematic in Japan as it is in many
other industrialized countries. In Japan, organized criminal groups
pose a threat not only to the general safety of society, but more
significantly in recent years, to the economic welfare of the country.
Organized criminal groups in Japan are composed predominantly of
professional criminals known as yakuza, who are politically connected
and financially strong. 68 Today, there are more than eighty thousand
members of the yakuza-a number four times larger than that of the
Italian-American Mafia-active worldwide, with investments ranging
69
from nightclubs in China to real estate in New York.

65.
Interview with Hajime Nakata, attorney, Miyake & Yamazaki, in
Nashville, TN (Dec. 4, 2001).
66.
Id.
67.
Williams, supra note 61.
68.
David E. Kaplan, Japanese Organized Crime and the Bubble Economy, The
Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Occasional Paper, No. 70, 1 (Dec. 13, 1996).
69.
Id.
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Following World War II, the yakuza began to grow in
membership and power. 70 In the 1960s, politicians began to employ
gang members to keep left-wing protesters in line. 71 The yakuza soon
developed front companies that made bids on construction projects,
rigged sports games, negotiated contract disputes, and eventually
seized control of legitimate businesses.7 2 They invested heavily in the
73
Due to the
entertainment, real estate, and securities industries.
to
be a fertile
strong emphasis in Japan on saving face, Japan proved
ground for extortion and blackmail, and a vast industry of yakuza
corporate racketeers, called sokaiya, developed around Japan's
largest companies.74 During Japan's Bubble Economy 75 the yakuza
diversified, and at the peak of the bubble, Tokyo police counted 740
76
When the
offices run by organized criminal gangs in Tokyo alone.
77
economic bubble burst in 1990, the yakuza gained an unprecedented
windfall of tens of billions of dollars from loans that banks are now
78
unable to collect.
Today, the yakuza are engaged in traditional underworld
activities such as gambling, pornography, prostitution, and drugs, as
well as gray-area activities such as settling civil disputes and
property development.7 9 The yakuza have been called the "driving
force" behind almost all crime committed in Japan, and their
activities affect not only Japanese business and industry, but the rest

Id. The yakuza emerged in the seventeenth century as gambling gangs.
70.
Hiroaki Iwai, Organized Crime in Japan, in ORGANIZED CRIME: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 208, 208-09 (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1986). The conditions following World
War II were ripe for yakuza expansion due to the chaotic conditions of post-war Japan
where urban residents were forced to scrounge on the black market to survive. Id.
Under such circumstances, it was very difficult for people to stay within the confines of
the law, and the yakuza took advantage of these conditions to extend their power and
influence. Id.
Brian Bremmer & Emily Thornton, Blackmail, BUS. WK., July 21, 1997, at
71.
42.
Kaplan, supra note 68, at 2.
72.
Id.
73.
Bremmer & Thornton, supra note 71.
74.
The bubble economy refers to the skyrocketing real estate and stock market
75.
in Japan in the middle to late 1980s. Over-inflated land values became collateral for
endless amounts of credit extended to virtually any business in Japan. Kaplan, supra
note 68, at 3. In the late 1980s, the yakuza power and influence expanded greatly as
yakuza became absorbers of excess credit and gained access to billions of dollars in
loans from banks that did not screen borrowers. Id. at 4.
76.
Id. at 4.
In 1990, stock and real estate values plunged and the Nikkei index, Japan's
77.
stock exchange, lost $2 trillion in value, leading Japan into its worst economic slump in
40 years. Id. at 5.
Id. at 1.
78.
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of PrivateOrdering: An
79.
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 66

(2000).
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of the world as well.80 Due to a dearth of available attorneys and the
inefficiency of the Japanese court system, Japan is a fruitful place for
yakuza operations. 8 Mobsters are used to settle everything from car
Law enforcement
accident cases to landlord-tenant disputes. 82
officials have had a difficult time fighting the yakuza due to the
unwillingness of victims to report crimes,8 3 the skillfulness of yakuza
in evading the law, 84 and the tight links between leaders and
followers in yakuza crime syndicates.8 5 The nature of the yakuza,
coupled with a lack of laws to enable authorities to effectively combat
organized crime, have enabled the yakuza to expand their operations.
Today, the yakuza operate in many foreign countries, including the
88
United States.
In addition to the yakuza, there are other organized criminal
groups operating in Japan that pose a threat to the safety of society.
One recent example was the Aum Supreme Truth cult, a terrorist
group that evaded the Japanese authorities for years and ultimately
killed ten people and injured over five thousand in a nerve gas attack
The Aum Supreme Truth cult
in a crowded Tokyo subway.8 7
embarked on an extraordinary crime spree for nearly six years before
being caught by authorities.8 8 Journalists, concerned parents, and
defecting cult members repeatedly warned authorities about the cult,

Lt. Bruce A. Gragert, Yakuza: The Warlords of JapaneseOrganized Crime,
80.
4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 179 (1997).
81.
Bremmer & Thornton, supra note 71; see also Milhaupt & West, supra note
79, at 67 (stating that parties to civil disputes in Japan turn to organized crime-linked
settlement specialists to help resolve a variety of problems). For example, traffic
accident victims might hire a gang member to convince the other driver to provide
compensation. Id. Milhaupt and West suggest that such a phenomenon is linked to
low lawyer populations in Japan. Id. In fact, some members of organized criminal
firms view themselves as urashakaino bengoshi, or lawyers for the dark side of society.
Id.
Id.
82.
Iwai, supra note 70, at 229-30. Victims of crimes fear reprisals by the
83.
yakuza, and are therefore unwilling to report the crime to the police. Id. This in turn
creates a climate of exploitation and victimization that the yakuza can easily uncover.
Id.
84.
'See id. at 230. Organized criminals are familiar with legal loopholes and
tend to receive short prison sentences or fines. Id.
See id. at 231. The main obstacle in seeking arrest and obtaining
85.
conviction of a leader of an organized criminal syndicate is the willingness of followers
to assume blame and the lack of direct links between a leader and a criminal act. Id.
Members of crime syndicates are loyal and want to enhance their prestige among
leaders, so they often do the dirty work for a boss. Id. A young member's
imprisonment for a leader will bring him great prestige and, upon his release from
prison, he will be given a grand homecoming. Id.
See infra Part III.C.
86.
87.
Police plan to question cult leader on sarin gas attack, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, Mar. 27, 1995, available at 1995 WL 2232916.
88.
Kaplan, supra note 68, at 9. Criminal activities that the cult engaged in
included drug dealing, kidnapping, murder, and manufacture of biological and
chemical weapons. Id.
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but they did not take action until the cult released the deadly nerve
gas in the Tokyo subway.8 9 While authorities may have been
unwilling to investigate leads, a large part of their failure was due to
the antiquated structure of the system in which they were working. 90
David Kaplan categorized the situation as "a 1940s police force trying
to fight twenty-first century crime." 9 1 Without effective tools to fight
highly sophisticated criminal groups, Japanese authorities will
continue to have difficulty eradicating organized crime.
The
Communications Interception Act is one tool with which lawmakers
have equipped authorities in an attempt to bring leaders of criminal
groups to justice.
B. Dangers of Organized Crime to Japanese Society
Organized crime has had a significant impact on the economic
welfare of Japan. A number of financial analysts agree with the
police that the yakuza are the key to rectifying the current banking
crisis that exists in Japan as a result of bad loans made during the
Bubble Economy. 92 Japanese lenders have been unable to collect the
vast sums lent to the yakutza during 1980s. 93 Those who have tried to
collect on their loans have faced threats and violent attacks, and
three executives have been murdered since 1993. 94 Although the
amount of money lent to the yakuza during the 1980s is uncertain,
some economists believe that ten percent of the bad loans left by the
collapse of the bubble are tied directly to the yakuza, and another
thirty percent may be indirectly tied to gangs. 95 Some economists put
the figure much higher, but even pegging the figure at a conservative
96
amount, the yakuza owe more than $40 billion to Japanese lenders.
The impact of these bad loans on the Japanese economy has been
harmful, leading some analysts to call Japan's current economic
problems a "yakuza recession. '97 Many Japanese have called for a
crackdown on the growing economic strength of the yakuza, but the
anti-organized crime laws in Japan have not given authorities

89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. Kaplan attributes a number of factors to the failure of Japanese law
enforcement in the case of the Aum cult, including police incompetence, the
bureaucratic nature of the police force and decentralized police power which results in
local police departments trying to tackle sophisticated crimes for which they are illequipped to investigate. Id.
92.
Id. at 1.
93.
Id. at 5.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 6.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. (quoting Raisuke Miyawaki, former head of the Organized Crime
Division of the National Police Agency).
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sufficient measures to investigate bad loans and "crack-down" on
gangs. 98 If debts are not collected and the yakuza are able to retain
their assets, their current economic presence in Japan may increase
markedly, and they will emerge even stronger as the economy
improves.9 9 With greater assets and a worldwide reach, the Japanese
mobs can prey on legitimate businesses as never before, which will be
detrimental to Japan and the rest of the world as well. 10 0
Organized criminals already play a major role in Japanese
business, and many large corporations have close ties to yakuza
gangs. 10 Corporations have used gangsters for decades in a variety
of ways to ensure that business runs as planned. 10 2 One economic
commentator stated that the bigger the company is, the closer are its
links to the underworld.1 0 3 Criminal groups began associating with
big companies when executives turned to yakuza for private law
enforcement decades ago. 10 4 Corporations turned to yakuza to handle
activities that they were unwilling to undertake directly or were
unequipped to handle. 10 5 They hired yakuza for tasks such as
enforcing judgments, monitoring bid-rigging for public works projects,
manipulating stock prices, and collecting debts. 10 6 The degree of
yakutza involvement varies from industry to industry, but such
criminal services offered by the yakuza are more available in Japan
than most other industrialized countries, and most firms in Japan are
likely to encounter organized crime representatives. 10 7 Problems
began to arise for corporations once they turned to yakuza because
the yakuza, through the sokaiya, used information gathered in
performing these services to blackmail the company.' 0 8
Sokaiya are white collar gangsters tied to criminal syndicates
that extort money from companies. 109 Typically, sokaiya are nominal
shareholders and succeed in their extortion attempts by threatening
to ask embarrassing questions about the company's wrongdoings at
annual shareholder meetings. 110 Corporate executives are willing to
pay off the sokaiya for fear of losing face before their employees and

98.

Id.at 6-7.

99.
100.
101.

Id. at 7.
See id.
Michael Hirsh & Hideko Takayama, Big Bang or Bust; Mobsters Slow

Tokyo's Plan to Join World Markets, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1997, at 44.
102.
See id.
103.
Richard McGregor, Japan Inc.'s dirty secret, WORLD PRESS REV., Dec. 1994,
at 40 (quoting Hirokazu Itoh).
104.
Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the
United States: Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 767, 787 (1999).
105.
Id.
106.
Id. However, it should be noted that not all firms hire yakuza. Id. at 788.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
See id. at 767.
110.
Gragert, supra note 80, at 182.
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No other industrialized country has lived with
the public."'
corporate blackmail as Japan has, 112 and in recent years scandals
involving payments to sokaiya by some of Japan's most prestigious
financial institutions have drawn international attention to Japan's
corporate problems." 3 Mob pressure on Japanese corporations is so
pervasive that many large companies maintain budgets for payments
to sokaiya.114 In a 1997 survey of large Japanese firms, ninety
percent indicated that they had been approached by sokaiya with
extortionist demands; another poll of two thousand firms revealed
115
that seventy-seven percent of the firms polled paid the sokaiya.
Mark West has suggested that the nearest U.S. equivalent to these
recent Japanese scandals would be if the directors and managers of
Citicorp, Ford, General Electric, Motorola, Intel, Sara Lee, Macy's,
Bloomingdale's, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Salomon Smith
for
Barney, and Morgan Stanley were all arrested in the same year 116
paying the Italian Mafia to keep their shareholder meetings short.
The blackmail suffered by Japanese corporations due to their
corporate ties with organized crime only adds to Japan's economic
woes. Organized crime impedes Japan's efforts to open its markets
and seek investment from global sources. If Japan is unable to cut
back the power of sokaiya racketeers, it will not become a more
influential player in the global financial system." 7 In recent years,
the government has begun to take efforts to sever the ties between
corporations and organized crime in an attempt to grow in the global
financial market. 118 Authorities are beginning to crack down on
companies for paying off organized criminals; dozens of top executives
have been arrested.'1 9 Still, the process of rooting organized crime
from corporate Japan has not been easy. 120 Racketeers have become
121
angry and lashed out with violence against corporate officers.

See id. Payment to the sokaiya is illegal and can result in civil or criminal
111.
liability for corporate executives, but this has not deterred payments to sokaiya. West,
supra note 104, at 791-93.
Bremmer & Thornton, supra note 71.
112.
West, supra note 104, at 785.
113.
Bremmer & Thornton, supra note 71 (quoting Satoshi Yamamoto, owner of
114.
a publishing company that publishes stories on corporate misdeeds and who has
allegedly been linked to yakuza crime syndicates). Ten percent of the billings from
Japan's largest law firm, Mori Sogo, now come from advising 100 major listed
companies on how to deal with sokaiya. Id.
115.
Id.
West, supra note 104, at 769.
116.
Hirsh & Takayama, supra note 101, at 44.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. Some of the most noted figures who have been arrested are former the
119.
Nomura Securities President and the former Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank chairman. Id.
See id. Some murders of corporate executives have been tied to sokaiya.
120.
Once such example was the 1997 murder of Koichiro Tarutani, who headed up the
customer complaint department of Yamaichi Securities. Id.
Id.
121.
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Companies have been unwilling to provide helpful information to
authorities out of fear of what may happen if they cooperate. 122 As
one unnamed executive said, "We are likely to lose our lives if we try
to cut our ties with criminal organizations and the sokaiya ...[b]ut if
we continue relations with them, we are likely to be arrested, thus
destroying our careers. Either way, we have to put our lives on the
line."'123 Thus, laws that merely outlaw corporate payoffs are unlikely
to stop the practice or to encourage foreign investment. Authorities
need more aggressive measures to investigate organized crime if
Japan wishes to achieve a truly free, fair, and global financial

market. 124
The wiretapping law is not aimed directly at fighting the types of
crimes that have had a hand in Japan's current financial problems,
but the law may indirectly help Japan correct some of its economic
problems. If Japan is able to collect on its bad debt and root out
corporate extortion, it will be able to entice foreign investment and
facilitate recovery from the current recession. One of the main
reasons why corporations and financial institutions have been unable
to solve these problems is fear that if they try to collect on loans or
stop blackmail payments, there will be reprisals. 125 With the death
and violence that have already occurred, those fears seem to be well
founded. Thus, Japan cannot depend upon corporations to correct the
problems that they have arguably created for themselves, and
authorities cannot count on companies to provide much assistance in
catching these criminals. Authorities need more tools to discover
criminal activity on their own, without relying so heavily on the
assistance of those who have been directly affected by organized
crime.
Electronic surveillance gives the authorities one of the
necessary tools because it enables them to gather the evidence needed
to arrest criminal suspects and stop criminal activity.
Murder is one of the four crimes for which wiretapping is
permitted. 126 Threats of murder and physical violence are the means
by which criminal syndicates have perpetuated their grasp on
corporate Japan; wiretapping, if used aggressively, could help
destabilize the criminal hold on financial institutions by preventing
organized murders of corporate executives and enabling authorities to
arrest those behind the extortion.
Removing some of the threat of violence might encourage
corporations to sever ties with organized crime, but realistically, the

122.
Id.
123.
McGregor, supra note 103, at 40.
124.
See Hirsh & Takayama, supra note 101, at 40. Former Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto stated that his ,goal was to achieve a "free, fair, and global"
financial market by 2001. Id.
125.
See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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wiretapping law does not give authorities enough power to eradicate
organized crime from the Japanese economy. In its current form, the
wiretapping law does not permit the use of electronic surveillance for
the types of financial crimes in which the yakuza are involved. Only
threats of murder in connection with financial crimes can trigger
permissible legal use of wiretapping. For Japan's financial markets
to be more attractive to foreign investors, investors will need more
assurance that Japan is working to abolish corporate ties with the
A more aggressive wiretapping law that allows
underworld.
authorities to conduct wiretapping in a wider variety of suspected
crimes may help. Although such a law will not automatically cure the
current problems, it will give authorities more power to locate
criminal activity.
C. Global Threats of Organized Crime
The yakuza began to expand their activities into foreign
countries in the late 1960s.127 First, the gangs expanded their
activities into nearby Korea after ethnic Koreans living in Japan
joined criminal groups in substantial numbers and were able to open
up doors to their country. 128 Then, as the yen became stronger and
more Japanese began traveling abroad, the yakuza followed their
countrymen to other Asian countries and appeared in Taipei, Manila,
and Bangkok, arriving in places as far away as Brazil, Italy,
Australia, and the United States by the 1980s. 129 As the yakuza
smuggling
expanded abroad, they began forging criminal alliances,
13 0
guns and drugs, and engaging in sexual slavery.
Two of the activities in which organized criminal groups in
Japan are heavily involved are drug trafficking' 3 ' and human
smuggling, both of which have a significant impact on the global
community, and which were some of the primary concerns of the
United Nations General Assembly when the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime was signed in December 2000.132

Kaplan, supra note 68, at 1.
127.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 2; see also Frank F.Y. Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, A Descriptive
Analysis of Japanese Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988, 2 INT.
CRIM. JUST. REV. 19, 38 (1992) (reporting that in 1984 the President's Commission on
Organized Crime received testimony from witnesses who stated that the illegal
activities of Japanese criminals were appearing in Hawaii, Los Angeles, San Diego,
and New York).
130.
Kaplan, supra note 68, at 2.
131.
Id. Kaplan states that drugs, especially crystal methamphetamine, are the
biggest moneymakers for the gangs providing one third of all yakuza income. Id.
U.S. Department of State, GeneralAssembly adopts Major Treaty targeting
132.
Organized Crime, (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www/usinfo.state.gov/topical
global/ traffic/00111601.htm.
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Japan's prostitution industry, for instance, is controlled by the
yakuza.
It is vast and expansive, a classic example of the
internationalization of criminal activity that harms the global
community. 13 3 The yakuza are responsible for importing many of the
more than 100,000 Asian women who have been smuggled into Japan
illegally from Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and
Korea, lured by the promise of economic success. 134 Without effective
laws enabling Japanese police to discover these activities, Japanese
criminal syndicates will continue to pose a threat to the international
community.

IV.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION ACT

Critics of the wiretap law raise two primary legal challenges:
that the law is unconstitutional and that police and prosecutors who
already possess overly broad investigative powers will apply it
illegally. The Japanese Supreme Court has reviewed the law and
held it to be constitutional so long as it is implemented according to
legal procedures. 35 Authorities have vowed that they will not apply
the law arbitrarily; however, opponents are not satisfied because they
believe that potential for abuse of the law is high and that it directly
36
conflicts with Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution.
A. ConstitutionalIssues
On its face, the Communications Interception Act appears to
violate two human rights protections guaranteed by the Japanese
Constitution.
Article 21 protects secrecy of any means of
communication: "No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the
secrecy of any means of communication be violated."' 37 Article 35
guarantees the right to privacy: "The right of all persons to be secure
in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and
seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for
adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched
and things to be seized ..
,,38
3..
These unresolved constitutional
issues led to the revision of the original bill, limiting wiretapping to
only four types of crime and placing other restrictions on the
practice.139

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Huang & Vaughn, supra note 129, at 39.
Id.
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
KENPO, art. 21.
Id. art. 35.
Choy, supra note 9.
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In December 1999, the Japanese Supreme Court examined the
law and opined that if performed according to the required
procedures, the law is constitutionally permissible so long as it is
needed for a criminal investigation. 140 Proponents have not been able
to give an explanation that is completely satisfactory to opponents for
why the wiretapping law does not violate Article 21, but there are two
explanations for why the Japanese Supreme Court held the law to be
constitutional.
First, Japanese society as a whole has always been more focused
on group welfare than individual rights, and this characteristic is
reflected in the court's historically narrow interpretation of individual
rights. Japan has been referred to as a "communitarian feudal
democracy," where mutual respect and understanding are prized, and
the enforcement of individual rights an anathema. 141 When the
current Japanese Constitution went into effect in 1947, some
Japanese resented what they felt was a forced adoption of a foreignauthored constitution. 14 2 Conservative Japanese objected to the
heavy emphasis on individual rights, which they believed to be
radical content for the hierarchical Japanese society. 143 In fact, in
1957 the Japanese Diet appointed a Commission on the Constitution
to review possible amendments to strengthen public and collective
Although the
rights against private and individual rights. 144
145
a public opinion poll conducted at the
revisions were never made,
time revealed that the general public felt that Japanese law should
place more emphasis on public welfare. 146 Given these public
sentiments, it is understandable why the court chose to interpret
individual rights narrowly. Expanding individual rights would place
the judges at risk of public disapproval and would not be in
accordance with general public sentiment. 147 Moreover, judges may

140.
Wiretaps Vital in War on High-Tech Crime, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 21, 2000,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei Weekly File.
141.

MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: TEXT AND MATERIALS 510 (1997)

(quoting Lawrence W. Beer, who comments that mutualist understanding may more
adequately protect individuality and the rights of each person than a self-centered
individualism blind to the rights and needs of other individuals and the community).
142.
Herbert W. Bolz, Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of Restraint, 4
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 87 (1980), reprinted in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND

LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 225 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
See id.
143.
144.
Id. at 256.
145.
The Commission on the Constitution was boycotted by progressive parties
and chose to make no formal recommendations to the Diet, but the Commission did file
a report to the legislature noting its proposal that public rights be strengthened and
individual rights limited. Id.
Id. The Japanese public opposed revisions to the Constitution to make
146.
public welfare clauses more clearly restrictive of individual rights, but they did feel
that more emphasis should be placed on public welfare.
Id. at 256.
147.
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believe that they are expected to moderate the more objectionable
provisions of the Constitution by interpreting it according to public
welfare ideals in an effort to assimilate the Constitution into
148
Japanese society and forestall amendments.
In past decisions where the court has ruled on constitutional
provisions concerning individual rights, the court has made clear that
articles in the Constitution that protect individual rights can be
limited, even without a provision for restricting such rights. 149 In
Koyama v. Japan,15 0 the court ruled on how the freedom of censorship
guaranteed under Article 21(2) was to be balanced against Article 175
of the Penal Code, which prohibits the distribution or sale of obscene
material. In this case, a Japanese publisher was held to have
violated Article 175 by publishing a translation of Lady Chatterley's
Lover. 151 The court found the novel obscene because it "wantonly
stimulates or arouses sexual desire or offends the normal sense of
sexual modesty of ordinary persons, and is contrary to proper ideas of
sexual morality."'152 The court stated that the standard to be applied
was "the good sense operating generally through society ... [which is]
not the sum of understanding of separate individuals . . . [but is] a
collective understanding."'1 53 Furthermore, the court stated that the
judgment on what the prevailing ideas of the society are is entrusted
to judges. 154 The court found that the novel went beyond the limits
recognized by the prevailing ideas of society, and upheld the
conviction of the publisher.155
In reconciling its finding with Article 21, which expressly states
that no censorship shall be maintained, the court held that Article 21
and other articles guaranteeing individual fundamental human
rights stand under restriction for public welfare and are not
unlimited. 156 The court held that this principle meant that such
rights could be restricted for the public welfare. 157 Thus, not only did
the court establish that constitutional provisions were not absolute
and that their effect could be modified by legislation, it also
established that the concept of public welfare was malleable and
could change over time. Furthermore, the court established itself as
the final arbiter of what the standard for public welfare should be, a

148.
149.
150.

Id.
See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
Koyama v. Japan, 11 KEISHO 97 (1957), reprinted in KENNETH L. PORT,

COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 196 (1996).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

An English novel by D.H. Lawrence, published in 1928.
PORT, supra note 150, at 197.
Id.
Id:
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-200.
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significant holding considering that, in Japan, there are no jury
trials.
The wiretap law undoubtedly will restrict individual privacy and
violate the secrecy of communication to some extent, but it is clearly a
law designed to advance the public welfare because it protects the
general population. Even though the law appears to contradict
Article 21 of the Constitution directly, the law comports with
traditional Japanese ideology and legal theory. Furthermore, Articles
12 and 13 counterbalance individual rights with the public welfare. 158
Article 12 states that the people "shall refrain from any abuse of
these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for
utilizing them for the public welfare."'159 Article 13 provides that a
person's right to "life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to
the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the
supreme consideration in legislation ....-160 Kazuo Izawa, an officer
with the National Police Agency, and Hajime Nakata, stated that
these two Articles have consistently been used to uphold government
restrictions on individual liberties, provided that the restrictions
adopted are the least restrictive means for protecting the public
welfare. 16 1 There is, therefore, some constitutional basis for the
court's opinion that the law is constitutional if used in accordance
with legal procedures.
A second explanation for the court's reluctance to declare the
wiretap law unconstitutional is that, under the Japanese system,
judges lack strong judicial review powers. The fifty-three year
history of the present system has been characterized as a period of
"cautious conservatism," in which the court has been self-restrained
and deferential to the legislative branch. 162 The court has declared a
law unconstitutional only five times; it has invalidated legislation
only four times. 163 One explanation for the court's conservatism is
that there is considerable ambiguity concerning which branch of
government is superior. Article 81 grants the court the power of
judicial review, 16 4 but Article 41 designates the Diet as the "highest

158.
Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1990), reprinted in PORT, supra note 150, at 212.
159.
KENPO, art. 12.
160.
Id. art. 13.
161.
Interview with Kazuo Izawa and Hajime Nakata, attorneys in Nashville,
TN (Dec. 4, 2001).
162.
DEAN, supra note 141, at 513.
163.
Id. Another interpretation of the rarity in invalidating legislation is that
the Japanese Diet has been extremely successful in drafting legislation. Id.
164.
Article 81 reads: "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power
to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act." KENPO,
art. 81.
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organ of state power."'165 This apparent inconsistency could be the
reason why the court has been hesitant to invalidate laws passed by
the Diet, and it may also explain why the court did not find the
1 66
wiretap law unconstitutional.
Another possible explanation for the conservative attitude of the
court and its restraint in invalidating legislation is that judicial
independence is nominal, due to the control that one political party
has held over the Diet since the implementation of the current
political regime. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has dominated
politics in the post-war period and has exerted control over all aspects
of judicial appointments. 167 The LDP is a conservative party and has
appointed conservative judges.' 68 These conservative judges have
been predisposed to support government actions. 169 It is therefore
predictable that the court has exercised self-restraint in its judicial
review powers and interpreted the Constitution in accordance with
the conservative viewpoints of the LDP. It was the LDP that
promoted the wiretap law, thus it is not surprising that the court
found a way to interpret the wiretap law to be consistent with the
Constitution.
Still, such explanations would not be satisfactory to hard-liners
who interpret the Constitution literally. One might wonder why,
then, the Diet did not choose to amend the Constitution to avoid the
constitutional attack that the law has suffered. Although it was
considered, an amendment would not have been an easy route for the
Diet to choose.
To amend the Constitution, two-thirds of the
Members of both houses of the Diet and a majority of all votes cast in
170
a national referendum must approve a constitutional amendment.
Opposition parties have always held enough seats to block such an
amendment. 171 When amendments have been proposed, opposition
parties respond that amendments will take Japan back to the days of
pre-World War II military rule.' 72 A judicial decree declaring the law
constitutional, therefore, is much more acceptable than an
amendment revising Article 21.

165.
Article 41 states: "The Diet shall be the highest organization of state power,
and shall be the sole law-making organ of the state." Id. art. 41.
166.
DEAN, supra note 141, at 506.
167.
Id. at 509.
168.
Bolz, supra note 142, at 253.
169.
Id.
170.
Id. at 256.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.

2002]

JAPAN'S COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTIONACT

B. Objections Based on CriminalProcedure
Criminal procedural laws in Japan give investigators and
prosecutors broad discretion to deal with criminal suspects.
Opponents of the law fear that these broad powers will give
authorities license to apply the wiretap law arbitrarily to the
detriment of individual privacy. 173 There are concerns that the
restrictions placed on the law will be impossible to enforce. 174 These
fears can be traced to several laws and practices in the criminal
justice system, which has eroded constitutional protections of privacy
by granting police and prosecutors significant powers to investigate
crimes. Opponents of the law fear that the protections of individual
freedoms will be further eroded with the introduction of the wiretap
law.
One law that gives police tremendous discretion and provided a
broad statutory exception to the right to privacy is the Police Duties
Law. 175 The Police Duties Law grants law enforcement officials the
authority to stop and question anyone in connection with a criminal
investigation. 176 Investigators have used the law to conduct searches
when police feel that criminal activity may be taking place. 177 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this law liberally and broadened the
statutory exception under the law in 1978 when it ruled in Japan v.
Sakai 178 that the law vested police with the power to search anyone
in relation to a criminal investigation without a warrant, even when
there is adequate opportunity to obtain a warrant. 179 Furthermore,
the court held that police were authorized to take all reasonably
necessary steps to confirm suspicions of criminal activity.' 8 0 The
court stressed that the rights of individuals are not paramount in all
situations; at times individual rights must yield to the public's
interest in successfully completing a criminal investigation. 181 As
interpreted, the Police Duty Law allows authorities to conduct
18 2
searches in the absence of probable cause.

173.
See supra Part II.C,
174.
See id.
175.
The Police Duties Law, Law No. 163 of 1954.
176.
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
177.
William B. Cleary, The Law of CriminalProcedure in Contemporary Japan,
41 HOKKAIDO L. REV. 1284, 1346 (1991).
178.
Japan v. Sakai, 32 KEISHO 670 (1978).
179.
Susan Maslen, Japan and the Rule of Law, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 281,
287 (1998); see also Cleary, supra note 177, at 1362.
180.
Maslen, supra note 179, at 287.
181.
Sakai, 32 KEISHO at 688; see also Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights
Revolution in Japan:A Story of New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
127, 159 (1994).
182.
William B. Cleary, Opinion of a Scholar: Criminal Investigation in Japan,
26 CAL. W. L. REV. 123, 133 (1989).

916

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:893

Japanese courts are highly deferential to the judgment of law
183
enforcement officials and have upheld a variety of search practices.
Evidence obtained under questionable circumstances is rarely
excluded because courts always find that the requisite degree of
necessity for the search exists. 184 Evidence can-and has beenobtained in ways that appear to violate individual rights, and the
methods used by police to obtain evidence would not be tolerated in
many other countries. In Japan v. Sakai, for instance, the court
upheld a warrantless search where the search took place two hours
after an arrest was made. 185 In this case, police received word that
there was a bank robbery and picked up two men in the vicinity of the
robbery for questioning. 186 The two men were taken to the police
station where the police requested that they open their briefcase and
reveal the contents.1 8 7 The men refused, and after over an hour of
questioning, the police became impatient and searched the bag
without a warrant, even though the two men were in custody and a
warrant could easily have been obtained. 188 Nonetheless, the court
held that the search was not illegal under the Police Duties Law. 189
In another case, the Japanese High Court ruled that evidence
obtained pursuant to a warrantless search that occurred almost two
months after the incident that gave rise to the arrest nevertheless
was permissible, because the evidence obtained in the search was
more important to the investigation than the rights of the
The propensity for courts to rule that evidence
individual. 190
obtained in a questionable manner is admissible in a trial
demonstrates the great degree of latitude given to police. In Japan,
objectionable procedures are not an extreme affront to individual
liberties because individual liberties are considered to be of secondary
importance to public safety. 19 1

Id. at 146.
183.
Id.
184.
185.
Ramlogan, supra note 181, at 159.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. (discussing Judgment of Dec. 26, 1983, 23 KEISHO 1625). In this case,
the police did obtain a warrant for arresting a man who had struck his girlfriend, but
they did not execute the warrant until two months after a complaint was filed against
the suspect, after they later learned that the suspect had a history of drug
involvement. When they finally acted upon the warrant for arrest for the battery
charge, they conducted a warrantless search of his house. Id.
Cleary, supra note 182, at 147. But see SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN
191.
JAPAN 23 (Frank G. Bennett & John 0. Haley trans., 1992) (stating that the Supreme
Court ruled in 1978 that evidence would not be admissible if the procedures were
gravely illegal and the exclusion of the evidence would be appropriate in the interest of
preventing future illegality). At the same time, the court held that it would be
unreasonable to exclude all illegally obtained evidence because doing so would
jeopardize the search for truth. 32 KEISHO 1672 (1978).
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The Police Duty Law thus provides powerful precedent for the
belief that courts will not enforce the restrictions in the wiretap law,
and will consider evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps. If police
decide to arbitrarily wiretap individuals who have committed minor
crimes, they may discover information of criminal activity that they
might not otherwise have obtained. For people who are not suspected
in any crime at all, there are concerns that police might be able to
listen to a non-criminal conversation without any fear of reprisal for
abuse of the law.
Restrictions on the law designed to ensure that police do not
abuse their powers under the law seem insufficient. For example, the
requirement that a third party monitor the wiretapping will do little
to ensure compliance with the law, because the third party is barred
from reading or listening to the intercepted communication. 1 92 The
obligation to send notification to a party who has been wiretapped
applies only to crime-related conversation; all other intercepted
193
communications do not have to be reported to the monitored party.
The requirement that communications can only be intercepted
pursuant to a court order is also unsatisfactory because judges tend
to take police presentations at face value. For instance, in cases of
arrest, which also require a court order, courts refuse warrants for
arrest only 0.1% of the time. 194 As critics have noted, unlike other
countries with a wiretap law, the Japanese police system does not
have organizations analogous to the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Without proper restiaint,
Investigations to expose injustice. 195
authorities could become a "big brother," indiscriminately monitoring
people's lives and violating people's privacy.
Not only have the courts given police license to use their
discretion to investigate criminal suspects, prosecutors, too, have
enabled police to conduct liberal investigations of criminal suspects.
Police and prosecutors in Japan have a close working relationship,
and prosecutors in Japan exercise a substantial amount of control
over the police relative to U.S. prosecutors. 196 Japanese prosecutors
have little responsibility for reviewing police practices to ensure that
the rights of defendants are protected. 197 Prosecutors are almost
exclusively concerned with the nature of the evidence obtained by the
police, not the methods by which the evidence is obtained. 198
Although there is judicial review of a prosecutor's discretion to indict

Hoffman, supra note 11.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
195.
Hasegawa, supra note 24.
196.
See Didrick A. Castberg, ProsecutorialIndependence in Japan, 16 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 72 (1997).
Id.
197.
198.
Id.
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or suspend prosecution, courts are reluctant to overrule the
prosecutor's discretion and judicial review is deferential at best. 199
With such a lack of oversight by either courts or prosecutors, the
Japanese public has to rely on the police, who they have increasingly
grown to distrust, to self-police when using their wiretapping powers.
Police and prosecutors have other powerful investigative tools
that they are entitled to use after they have detained a suspect but
before filing any charges. For example, criminal suspects can be
detained for up to twenty-three days without formal charges being
brought against them. 200 During this time, suspects are placed in
holding cells at police stations, where they are readily available for
interrogations that may run late into the evening. 20 1 During these
sessions, the defendant does not have the right to have counsel
present, and defense counsel must have the approval of police or
prosecutors to see a client. 20 2 In general, attorneys are allowed one
meeting with the suspect while the suspect is in police custody for two
203
days, and from two to five visits during the remaining twenty days.
In contrast to the lengthy investigation that precedes arrest in the
United States, Japanese prosecutors use this time to build up their
case and to attempt to coerce a confession.2 0 4 As one Ministry of
Justice official noted: "When all is said and done, pre-indictment
detention in Japan is for the purposes of questioning the suspect,
20 5
demanding a confession, and pursuing other crimes."
Daniel H. Foote asserts that the main danger presented by the
Japanese criminal justice process is the possibility that investigators
For example, if
will unconsciously manipulate evidence. 20 6
investigators act on circumstantial evidence, they would be able to

199. Id. at 73. In a case in which the Supreme Court validated the principle of
reversal of conviction based on misuse of prosecutorial discretion, the court did not
actually reverse the defendant's conviction because it held that discrimination on the
part of police should not result in invalidating the prosecution of the defendant. Id.
(discussing Japan v. Fukumoto).
See Daniel H. Foote, The Right to Silence in Japan,21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
200.
L. 415, 431 (1991).
201.
Id.
202.
MIYAZAWA, supra note 191, at 22. Article 39 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that when necessary for the investigation, the prosecutor and police
may designate times, places, and durations for meetings between suspects and their
counsel. Id.
203.
Id. These meetings typically last fifteen minutes, and meetings are usually
denied if the suspect refuses to talk or admit to the crime. Id. Thus, the primary focus
of the detention period is investigation rather than defense. Id.
204. Confessions are extremely important for the prosecution in Japan. Courts
have come to expect full and detailed confessions, and judges are reluctant to convict a
defendant without a confession. Foote, supra note 200, at 472. Investigators are
therefore concerned that if they do not obtain full confessions they cannot prove guilt.
Id.
205.
Id. at 431 (translating the statement of Masayoshi Honda).
206.
Id. at 475.
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pick up a suspect and lead him to a confession that fits the existing
evidence. 20 7 Some people have suggested that Japanese suspects are
more likely to give false confessions as a result of cultural
expectations and their great deference to authority.2 0 8 This tendency,
coupled with the suspect's isolation for up to twenty-three days,
creates the potential for a suspect to confess to a crime that he did not
209
commit.
The new wiretap law gives investigators an easy means to act on
their hunches. Investigators can wiretap communications and use
any hint of criminal activity to pick up a suspect and bring him in for
extensive questioning. Even if the suspect is not guilty of the crime
in question, he could be brought in and interrogated for other crimes,
or confess to a crime he did not commit based on the limited evidence
obtained by police during the wiretapping.
C. Public Distrustof Police
In the past few years, the image of the Japanese police has been
tarnished due to a string of scandals involving several different
prefectural police offices and high-ranking officers. 210 The national
perception of police as honest protectors of the public welfare has
eroded considerably, and has led a large percentage of the population
to distrust the police. 21' This carries over into a distrust of police use
of the wiretap law. With such broad powers granted to the police,
critics fear that police will have free license to invade the privacy of
all citizens, not merely criminal suspects.
The Japanese public has not always lacked confidence in their
police force. In public opinion polls taken in the 1980s and 1990s,
seventy percent of respondents said they trusted the police. 212 In
opinion polls taken during 2000, the number of respondents who said
that they trust the police had declined considerably.2 13 The decline in
public confidence in the police may be due to many scandalous affairs
that have recently surfaced. In a six-month period from September
1999 to March 2000, a Kyodo News survey reported that police forces
had been involved in 167 scandals, and 113 police officers and

207.
Id. at 475-76.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
210.
211.
See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
212.
See Peter Hadfield, Japanese Shocked by Police Misdeeds, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 10, 2000, at 32.
The Japan Times reported that in one nationwide survey conducted in
213.
2000, 73.1% of those surveyed voiced dissatisfaction with one or more aspects of police
investigations. See Police Promisesare not Enough, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000. In a
spring 2000 poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, 60% of respondents said
that they do not trust the police. See Hadfield, supra note 212.
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officials were arrested in connection with cover-ups, leaks of
investigative information, and performance of obscene acts. 214 By
contrast, the number of disciplinary actions imposed on police officers
215
from 1990 to 1998 ranged between eleven and twenty per year.
With news of police cover-ups and other abuses of power, it is not
surprising that critics of the wiretap law claim that police will abuse
the law.
Reinforcing this fear is the memory of the illegal
wiretapping of a Japan Communist Party leader in 1986 by the
Kanagawa police. 216 Despite a ruling by the Tokyo High Court that
members of the police force were involved in illegal wiretapping and
an order that the prefectural government pay four million yen in
damages, the police have continued to deny that wiretapping ever
2 17
took place and insist that nothing illegal was done.
The ability of the police to cover-up wrongdoing within the
department is facilitated by the nature of the Japanese police system.
There is no system to obtain information about the internal workings
of law enforcement, so the' police are able to keep their internal
affairs secret. 2 18 The police force is also very hierarchical, with the
head of the department treated like a king, and subordinates hesitant
2 19
to express critical opinions no matter how correct they may be.
Until the police system undergoes major reforms, or the police
demonstrate that they are able to monitor themselves, critics will
continue to attack the wiretap law on the grounds that police cannot
be trusted to enforce the law properly.
V. WILL THE WIRETAP LAW BE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL IN FIGHTING
ORGANIZED CRIME?

With the wiretap law in its early stages, it remains to be seen
whether it will create a rash of illegal privacy violations, or whether
it will be effective against organized criminal activity. As the Diet
passes legislation aimed at making law enforcement authorities more
accountable for their actions, the public should feel some comfort that
police will not abuse the law. In late 2000, the Diet took steps in that

214.
See 167 Police Scandals Registered in Last Six Months, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 19, 2000.
215.
Id.
216.
See MIYAZAWA, supra note 191, at 5.
Members of the Kanagawa
Prefectural Police Headquarters in charge of national security matters were found to
have placed a wiretap on the phone of Yasuo Ogata, but they would not reveal who the
higher-ranking officers were who approved the wiretapping. Id.
217.
Kiroku Hanai, Police Resisting Vital Reform, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Japan Times File.
218.
Japanese Police Must Lift Shroud of Secrecy, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 20,
1999, at 3, available at 1999 WL 17757239.
219.
See Hanai, supra note 217.
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direction, proposing a Police Reform Bill. 220 If passed, the bill would
give public safety commissions the power to order and lead
investigations into alleged police abuses, thus lifting the veil of
secrecy behind which the police force has been able to hide. 22 1 As the
police force undergoes reform, it will be more difficult for law
enforcement to abuse their powers, and public faith in the police force
may be restored.
At present, signs indicate that the problem with the law will not
be overuse and abuse, but under-use and inefficiency in fighting
crime. In February 2001, six months after the law was enacted, the
Justice Ministry reported that investigators had not engaged in any
wiretapping whatsoever. 222
The Justice Ministry listed several
problems that prevented investigators from resorting to wiretaps in
criminal investigations, including technical problems, strict
conditions placed on the law, and public opposition to the
legislation. 223 Technical problems resulted because of difficulties
encountered in wiretapping cellular phone conversations. 224 With
time, these technical problems will likely be solved and not impede
the use of wiretaps.
Strict conditions placed on the law and
opposition to the law are more difficult problems, however, and must
be overcome before the law can be used effectively. Hajime Nakata
asserts that the law has so many restrictions that it is essentially
impossible for the police to take advantage of it. 225 Nakata notes that
the conditions for using a wiretap are more burdensome than the
conditions for obtaining an arrest warrant. 226 The requirement that
a third party be present during the wiretapping, that wiretapped
individuals be contacted and informed as to why they were
wiretapped, and the strict limitation on the crimes for which wiretaps
can be used make the law impractical. Until these conditions are
relaxed, it is unlikely that the law will be used at all.
The distrust that the public feels toward the police today should
not cause the public to be concerned that police will abuse their
powers under the Communications Interception Act. Rather, law
enforcement is well aware that they have lost public approval and are

220.
Police Reform Bill Clears Lower House, JAPAN POLVY & POL., Nov. 6, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 29267263. The proposed law would be the first major reform of
the police force since it was inaugurated in 1954. Id.
221.
See id.
222.
Ministry to Report No Wiretapping since Law Entered into Force, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 8, 2001, available in LEXIS, News Library, Japan Economic
Newswire File.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
Interview with Hajime Nakata, supranote 65.
226.
See id.
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227
therefore likely to be concerned about cleaning up their image.
Before the law went into effect, law enforcement authorities were
warned against infringing on constitutional privacy provisions when
using surveillance. 228 These warnings, coupled with memories of the
1986 illegal wiretapping, 229 seem to have made police too hesitant to
use wiretaps in criminal investigations. Until police overcome their
hesitancy to use the law, the law will not have any effect in reducing
organized criminal activity.
Some detectives and journalists who keep tabs on the yakuza
have warned that not only will the law have no effect on fighting
organized crime, but that it might have the opposite effect, pushing
Masahiro
organized criminal activity further underground. 230
Yamada, a journalist who follows the criminal underworld, has said
that he believes the law will not lead to any arrests of organized
criminals because higher-level criminals have assumed for years that
police are listening to their conversations and have developed
sophisticated ways to avoid having their communications
intercepted. 231 The most important messages are conveyed in person,
often by written notes that are quickly destroyed. 232 Yamada also
believes that the law will have an adverse effect on law enforcement
abilities to fight organized crime because little information about
gang activities will filter back to the police. 233 Yamada points out
that prior to the enforcement of an anti-gang law passed in 1992,
police and yakuza maintained a give-and-take relationship, tipping
each other off to their respective activities through informal
channels. 23 4 After the 1992 law went into effect, gang members were
ordered by their superiors to assume a lower profile and keep quiet,
235
which resulted in less information filtering back to the police.
Potential inefficacy remains a large concern for critics of the wiretap
law.

227.
The National Police Agency's white paper (a yearly report) for 2000
recognized for the first time ever the need to repair the tarnished image of Japan's
police forces and tackled the subject of criminal acts committed by police, including
cover-ups of illegal behavior by fellow officers. Police Promises are not Enough, supra
note 213.
228.
Id.
See supra Part III.C.
229.
230.
See Eric Johnston, Will Wiretap Law Catch Mob Off Guard?, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1999, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Japan Times File.
231.
Id.
232.
Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.

20021

JAPAN'S COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION ACT

VI. CONCLUSION

The Communications Interception Act may not help law
enforcement eradicate organized crime, but when coupled with other
anti-organized crime laws, it will give authorities some needed
assistance to locate criminal activity. As criminal groups grow in
power and sophistication, law enforcement authorities need to be
given expanded powers to fight criminal activity. As law enforcement
powers are expanded, it will be difficult to avoid invasions into the
privacy of innocent citizens, but that is a price that people pay for
living in safer societies.
Furthermore, the Communications Interception Act may be
irreconcilable with the text of Japan's Constitution.
But the
Japanese people have demonstrated through their history and legal
culture that they are willing to sacrifice individual freedoms for the
sake of the public welfare. With the passage of time, Japanese people
will likely realize that what seems at present to be a "Big Brother"
invasion of privacy is actually necessary for the public welfare.
As Japanese people become more comfortable with the law and
more accustomed to its usage, lawmakers will have room to expand
the law and relax the strict conditions placed on the Communications
Interception Act.
Thus, for the first several years after
implementation, the law should not be expected to assist greatly in
the fight against organized crime. Rather, the next few years should
be viewed as transitional years in which the Japanese public is given
an opportunity to become comfortable with the law. It is possible that
the Communications Interception Act might not be used at all in the
next few years, but it should not be regarded as a failure if this
proves to be the case. It is most important now that the law gain
public acceptance so that it can be used effectively in the future.
Given the Japanese history of commitment to the public welfare,
vocal opposition to the law will likely subside over the next few years,
and legislators will be able to adapt the law to fit its intended purpose
better.
When Japan reaches this point, the Communications
Interception Act may begin to help Japan in its fight against
organized crime.
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